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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

WHO IS REALLY BEING PROTECTED BY REGULATION OF THE
COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY?: IMPLICATIONS OF AMERICAN
TELEPHONE & TELEGRAPH CO. V. CENTRAL OFFICE
TELEPHONE, INC.

I.

INTRODUCTION

With the growth of the Internet and the World Wide Web, cellular
telephones, and traditional telephone service, the communications industry is
one of the fastest growing industries in the world.1 Early on, like industries
preceding it, the unregulated communications industry met with public
resistance due to perceived unfair pricing practices.2 State legislatures
responded to the public outcry by passing laws that regulated the rates that
communications companies could charge for services.3 Soon, however, the
industry grew beyond the scope of local and state regulations, and Congress
acted to regulate the growing national communications industry.4 This initial
regulation quickly proved to be inadequate to address the still-growing
communications industry.5 Finally, Congress drew on its experience with
regulation of the transportation industry, and passed the Communications Act
of 1934 (“Communications Act”).6 The Communications Act required
common carriers in the telecommunications industry to file rate tariffs that
precisely described the allowable rates for services.7 The Communications Act
1. THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 6 (Charles P. Cozic ed., 1997).
2. See JOHN F. STOVER, AMERICAN RAILROADS 97 (2nd ed. 1997) indicating that
merchants, farmers, and communities pushed for government regulation of the railroad industry
because of discrimination in freight rates. See also LEONARD S. HYMAN ET AL., THE NEW
TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY: EVOLUTION AND ORGANIZATION 73 (1987) where, in
response to customer complaints about cost and service, the Indiana legislature in 1885 passed a
law regulating the price of telephone service.
3. See ALAN STONE, WRONG NUMBER: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T 48 (1989). By 1921,
forty-five of the forty-eight states had established Public Utility Commissions to regulate the
telephone industry.
4. Id. Congress passed the [Mann-Elkins Law in 1910], which subjected the telephone
industry to federal rate jurisdiction, overseen by the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC).
5. Id. The [Willis-Graham Act was passed in 1921], which extended the jurisdiction of the
ICC to telephone company mergers and acquisitions.
6. HYMAN, supra note 2, at 86. The Communications Act of 1934 created the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) to regulate the telephone industry’s interstate and foreign
business.
7. 47 U.S.C. § 203(a).
345
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has been held by the Supreme Court to supercede any state law claims
concerning matters related to the regulation of the telecommunications
industry.8 This was also the holding in the recent Supreme Court case,
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc.
(“AT&T”).9 While upholding the supremacy of the Communications Act over
state law attempts to regulate the industry, AT&T also established a pathway
allowing state law contract and tort claims to be superseded under the guise of
a relationship to regulation of the communications industry.
This note will first examine the development and history of the
Communications Act. Next, it will outline the factual history and lower court
decisions in the case. It will then discuss the majority, the concurrence, and
the dissenting opinions in AT&T. Finally, this note will examine the
implications of the AT&T decision to the communications industry and to the
public.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Regulation of Industries

At the turn of the century, both the transportation and the communications
industries were expanding rapidly across the United States.10 With the growth
of these industries, the public demanded regulation to stop the unreasonable
and discriminatory application of rates by the industries.11 Congress complied
with the public’s wishes by passing the Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”) in
1887, which regulated the more mature transportation industry.12 As the
communications industry also matured, Congress passed the Communications
Act of 1934 (“Communications Act”), and applied the same rules to the
communications industry that it had developed and applied to the
transportation industry through the ICA.13 Both of these acts provided similar
filed-rate doctrines, requiring common carriers to file tariffs describing all of

8. See, e.g., Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571 (1981) where the damages
in a state law breach of contract case were barred by the filed rate doctrine of the
Communications Act.
9. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1956
(1998).
10. See STOVER, supra note 2, at 81-82. The railroads were building to the Pacific coast,
and railroad companies had received land grants of 170 million acres from the federal
government. See also HYMAN, supra note 3, at 88-91 showing an increase in the number of
telephones installed each year throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s.
11. STOVER, supra note 2, at 97; HYMAN, supra note 2, at 73.
12. See STOVER, supra note 2, at 123. [The Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”)] required that
all interstate rates be “reasonable and just”.
13. HYMAN, supra note 2, at 86. The Communications Act, like the ICA, required that
service be provided at “reasonable charges”.
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their rates and charges so that the public could determine what the proper rates
were.14
1. Interstate Commerce Act – Regulation of Transportation
By the late 1800’s, railroad transportation had become the primary means
of transporting goods across the United States.15 Major railroad companies
controlled the railroad cars, and therefore controlled the flow of goods across
the country.16
In markets served by more than one railroad company, the competition to
attract customers was fierce. Railroad companies engaged in price wars,
accepting miniscule profits in order to attract customers.17 Many railroads in
these markets did not survive the competition, and were either taken over or
driven out of business by more financially secure companies.18
However, in markets where there was no competition among railroads, the
opposite occurred. Rates for transporting goods in these markets were
unreasonably high. With no alternative available, manufacturers would pay
the high shipping rates, and pass the cost along to the consumers in the form of
higher prices for goods.19
The combination of the rate wars in areas with competition, and the
artificially high rates in areas with no competition resulted in inconsistent
pricing for similar shipping.20 Manufacturers and consumers demanded
federal action in order to regulate the transportation rates. In response,
Congress passed the Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 (“ICA”).21 The ICA
provided for rate schedules to be published and regulated, and required

14. See STOVER, supra note 2, at 123. [The Interstate Commerce Act (“ICA”)] required that
all rate schedules for railroad services be published. See also 47 U.S.C. § 203(a)
(Communications Act) requiring telephone common carriers to publicly display and file their rate
schedules.
15. MAURY KLEIN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: THE RAILROAD IN AMERICAN LIFE 15-16
(1994). Railroads transported iron, coal and cotton, transforming the textile, food, and mail order
businesses.
16. STOVER, supra note 2, at 96. The railroads possessed a “complete monopoly” of the
nation’s commercial freight and passenger movement.
17. Id. at 108-109. Rate wars occurred when rival railroads operated or competed for the
same service areas. Rate wars were further aggravated by bankrupt rail companies, or those in
receivership, charging artificially low rates.
18. KLEIN, supra note 15, at 25-26.
19. Id. at 124-125. Two different rates structures for shipping had developed. One rate
applied to local, noncompetitive traffic, and a second rate for through, or competitive traffic.
20. Id.
21. The [Cullom bill in the Senate] and the [Reagan bill in the House] were combined into
the Interstate Commerce Act, which President Cleveland signed into law on February 4, 1887.
STOVER, supra note 2, at 123.
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common carriers to file tariffs that detailed the charges for services.22 With
regulation provided by the ICA, shipping rates were published, and the general
public was able to ascertain the proper shipping rates for a given route.23 This
virtually eliminated the price wars and uneven rates, and restored public
confidence in the transportation industry.24
2. Communications Act of 1934 – Regulation of Communication
As the transportation industry had developed and expanded in the United
States, the telecommunications industry was similarly developing.25 By the
time that ICA regulation of the transportation industry became mature,
Congress had already responded to public concern about the communications
industry and passed the Mann-Elkins Act in 1910.26 The Mann-Elkins Act
regulated the rates that telecommunications companies could charge for their
services.27 In addition, the Mann-Elkins Act established the Interstate
Commerce Commission (“ICC”) as a governing board for the communications
industry, and imposed an obligation on telecommunications common carriers
to provide service at “just and reasonable rates.”28
The booming telecommunications industry, however, outpaced the power
of the ICC’s regulation, and companies such as American Telephone &
Telegraph expanded across the country.29 Unlike the railroad industry,
telephone companies were considered to be primarily local industries, and the
existing federal regulation was ineffective.30 When it became obvious that the
communications industry was no longer merely a local concern, Congress
passed the Communications Act.31

22. Id. at 123. The bill also established the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) to
administer the Act.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 123-124, noting that the public reaction to the regulation was generally favorable.
Additional confidence was instilled when President Cleveland appointed five capable men to the
newly founded ICC.
25. HYMAN, supra note 2, at 88-91, showing that the telephone industry was growing at over
four times the rate of the general economy.
26. STONE, supra note 3, at 48. The Mann-Elkins Act extended the jurisdiction at the ICC
and gave it the power to federally regulate the telephone industry.
27. Id.
28. See STONE, supra note 3, at 48. See also Mann-Elkins Act of 1910, ch. 309, §7, 36 Stat.
539 (1910).
29. STONE, supra note 3, at 48.
30. See STONE supra note 3, at 48, where most telephone litigation concerned local rates or
service. The inability to regulate the large companies, such as AT&T, was at issue in several
major proceedings.
31. STONE, supra note 3, at 48. See also HYMAN, supra note 2, at 86, quoting the
Communications Act of 1934’s purpose [o]f regulating interstate and foreign commerce in
communication”.
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The Communications Act was intended to regulate the public telephone
and communication system.32 Drawing on its experience with the ICA,
Congress incorporated many of that Act’s provisions into the Communications
Act.33 In addition, Congress added provisions to create the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) as a government agency to govern the
communications industry.34 As with the ICA, the Communications Act
required carriers to file tariffs, or a schedule of charges, classifications,
regulations, and practices.35 The Communications Act further required prior
notice for tariff rate changes, and also mandated that common carriers file and
charge rates solely in accordance with published schedules.36 Just as the ICA
had regulated the transportation industry and restored public confidence in the
rate system, the Communications Act similarly regulated the communications
industry.
B.

Early Decisions

In both transportation and communication cases, the Supreme Court has
consistently upheld the validity of both the ICA and the similar
Communications Act filed-tariff requirements.
In Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, the Court dismissed a breach of
contract case against a railroad based on preemption by the ICA.37 There, a
railroad had agreed to ship a group of racehorses on a particular fast train.38
When the shipment did not take place on that train, the shipper of the horses
instituted a breach of contract claim against the railroad.39 The Court found
that the agreement to use a specific train for transporting the horses was an
agreement for a special service, which was not provided for in the published
tariff.40 Since the purpose of the published tariff was to avoid giving an

32. Id.
33. See 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) incorporating the requirements to publicly display and file rate
schedules, just as the ICA had required the transportation carriers to also display and file such
schedules.
34. HYMAN, supra note 2, at 86.
35. 47 U.S.C. § 203(a).
36. Id.
37. Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155, 166 (1912).
38. Id. at 162. Several different trains and routes were available to ship the livestock.
However, the route that ensured arrival in the shortest time was preferred. An agreement was
made to deliver the horses via the “Horse Special”, a fast stock train that ran only three times a
week.
39. Id. at 162-163. The horses did not ship via the “Horse Special”, they were in fact
shipped via a later and slower train, causing the horses to arrive forty-eight hours later than
anticipated. This later arrival prevented the horses from being put into proper condition for a
planned sale.
40. Id. at 165.
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advantage to one shipper that would not be extended to all, the Court found the
contract for the special shipping to be invalid.41
Similarly, in Davis v. Cornwell, the Court held that a promise by a carrier
to provide a group of railroad cars on a specified day was invalid.42 Again, the
Court found that the promise to provide the cars on a specific day was an
advantage to one shipper that was not extended to all, and was not allowed for
in the published tariff.43 The Court therefore found the agreement to provide
the cars to be invalid because the ICA preempted it.44
Likewise, in communications cases, the Court has applied the filed-rate
doctrine of the Communications Act, just as it has applied the doctrine of the
ICA to transportation cases.
In MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph
Co., the Court reiterated the validity of section 203 of the Communications
Act, including the filed-rate doctrine.45 Quoting from an earlier case, the Court
stated, for better or worse, the Act establishes a rate-regulation, filed-tariff
system for common-carrier communications, and the Commission’s desire “to
‘increase competition’ cannot provide [it] authority to alter the well-established
statutory filed rate requirements.”46
The Court has been consistent in allowing the filed-rate doctrine in both
the ICA and the Communications Act to preempt any agreements made outside
of the context of the filed tariff. In both transportation and communications
cases, the Court has followed the intent of the acts to provide uniform,
published rates that the public can access to determine the proper charges for a
carrier’s services.
41. Id. at 166. The purpose of the Commerce Act was to establish reasonable rates and
uniform application of those rates. This purpose would be defeated if any advantage were given
to one particular shipper. The Court found that allowing a shipper to specify the use of a
particular fast train was an advantage given to one that was not given at all. This was not
allowable unless the particular rates and shipping methods had been described in the published
and filed rate schedules.
42. Davis v. Cornwell, 264 U.S. 560, 562 (1924). Cornwell ordered empty cattle cars to be
ready for his use on a particular day. When they were not provided on that day, he sued for
damages for failure to provide the cars.
43. Id. at 562. The Court compared this case to Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, and
found that the promise here to provide empty cars on a particular day was similar to the promise
in Kirby to provide use of a particular train. The Court found that the promise of availability on a
particular day was not provided for in the published tariff, and was therefore preempted by the
tariff.
44. Id. at 562.
45. 512 U.S. 218 (1994). AT&T alleged that MCI was collecting unpublished rates for
providing long distance service, in violation of the Communications Act. Id. at 234. The Court
affirmed the finding of the Court of Appeals, and held that carriers must comply with the filedrate doctrine of 47 U.S.C. § 203(a).
46. Id. at 234, citing Maislin Industries, U.S., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 118, 135
(1990).
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III. AT&T V. CENTRAL OFFICE TELEPHONE
A.

Summary of Facts

American Telephone & Telegraph Company (“AT&T”) is a long-distance
service provider, and as such, they are considered to be a common carrier
under the Communications Act.47 In addition to providing long distance
services to its own customers, AT&T also sells its long distance services to
resellers, who in turn sell the long distance service to their customers. Central
Office Telephone, Inc. (“COT”) is a reseller of long distance services. COT
purchases long distance service from providers such as AT&T, and then resells
the service to its customers at a profit.48
In 1989, AT&T offered a long distance service called Software Defined
Network (“SDN”) service. Among its features, SDN allowed the reseller to
offer the long distance service to small businesses and residences, rather than
just to large businesses.
Since SDN service required large volume
commitments from resellers, the rates for SDN were typically lower than the
rates for other long distance services. In addition to the SDN service, AT&T
offered several billing options to the reseller, including an option called
Multilocation Billing (“MLB”) whereby AT&T would directly bill the
reseller’s customers for the SDN service, with the reseller remaining ultimately
responsible for all payments.49 As required by the Communications Act,
AT&T filed tariffs with the FCC defining the rates for its long distance
services, including its SDN service. The filed tariffs not only defined the
service rates, they limited AT&T’s liability for non-willful misconduct.50
After implementing the SDN service, orders from resellers increased and
AT&T had delays in actually providing the SDN service. In addition, AT&T
experienced “suppressed billing”51 problems which resulted in some customers
not receiving bills for long distance calls until one year after they had made the
calls. In response to these problems, AT&T limited the number of new SDN

47. See American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct.
1956, 1960 (1998); See also 47 U.S.C. 153(10) defining common carrier; See also 47 U.S.C. §
203(a).
48. American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct.
1956, 1960 (1998).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1960-1961. The agreement between the parties stipulated that the service would be
provided pursuant to the rates, terms and conditions as set forth in AT&T’s filed tariffs, and that
the filed tariffs would govern both parties’ obligations.
51. See Central Office Telephone, Inc. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 108 F.3d
981, 987 (1997). “Suppressed billing” occurs when the billing system cannot immediately
register a call to a particular customer. The calls are lumped into an unbilled toll group until a
billing guide is set up, then the customer is billed for all of the past unbilled calls.
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customers it would accept, and transferred the handling of reseller customers to
a new customer service center.52
On October 30, 1989, COT entered into a contract with AT&T to purchase
SDN service, which it planned to resell to its customers. In addition, COT
chose the MLB option, allowing AT&T to directly bill COT’s customers for
the SDN service. AT&T promised that the initial SDN service would be set up
in four to five months, and additional service requests would be processed
within 30 days.53
In April 1990, COT began reselling the SDN service, and encountered
immediate problems. There were delays in starting up the SDN service for its
customers, as well as suppressed billing problems. In addition, COT
customers were being billed incorrectly by AT&T. AT&T was billing under a
different plan than the one that COT had selected. This resulted in customers
receiving one hundred percent of the discount that COT was receiving from
AT&T for volume purchases, rather than the fifty percent discount that COT
intended. In October 1990, COT switched from the MLB direct billing plan to
a plan where COT received the entire bill for COT’s SDN service directly from
AT&T. COT then individually billed its customers for the SDN service.54
COT continued to resell the SDN service, but it was unable to fill its
commitment to AT&T for usage in the first contract period. AT&T also said
that COT owed them $200,000 in bills for the period in which COT was under
the MLB building plan. COT then informed AT&T that it was terminating its
contract as of September 30, 1992, one and one-half years prior to the
expiration of the contract.55
On November 27, 1991, COT filed suit against AT&T alleging breach of
contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and
tortious interference with contract.56
B.

District Court Opinion

In Central Office Telephone Company, Inc. v. AT&T, the district court jury
returned a verdict of $13,000,000 in favor of COT for its breach of contract
and tortious interference with contract claims.57 Additionally, the jury found in
favor of COT on AT&T’s counter-claim for $200,000 in unpaid charges.58

52. Id.
53. American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct.
1956, 1961 (1998).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. The suit was filed in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon.
57. Central Office Telephone Inc. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., 108 F.3d 981,
988 (1997). The judgment was entered on July 1, 1994.
58. Id.
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The district court rejected AT&T’s argument that the state law contract and
tort claims were preempted by the filed tariff doctrine of §203(a) of the
Communications Act. Instead, the court found that AT&T’s interpretation of
the filed-rate doctrine was too broad and that the doctrine did not preempt
COT’s state law claims.59 The court reasoned that since COT was complaining
only about the manner in which AT&T acted, and not disputing the validity of
the doctrine of the rates set in the tariff, that the filed-rate doctrine did not
apply. The court also rejected AT&T’s claim that there was no substantial
evidence that any of its conduct was within the tariff’s meaning of willful
misconduct.60
The court, however, denied COT’s request to present evidence of AT&T’s
financial condition to support its claim for punitive damages. It then granted
AT&T partial judgment as a matter of law, and omitted COT’s damages for the
period after September 1992, since the evidence did not support damages for
that period.61 In addition, the court denied AT&T’s motions for a new trial and
remittitur, and held that as a matter of law, the filed-rate doctrine did not
preempt COT’s claims.62
C. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the findings of the district
court, except the decision not to submit punitive damages evidence to the jury.
The decision was reversed, and the case was remanded on that issue.63
The court rejected AT&T’s claim that COT’s state law claims were
preempted by the Communications Act.64 AT&T asserted that the tariff-filing
requirement of the Communications Act is “Congress’s chosen means of
preventing unreasonableness and discrimination in charges . . . the tariff-filing
requirement is the heart of the common-carrier section of the Communications
Act.”65
The court found, however, that the billing option originally chosen by COT
was not covered by the filed-rate doctrine, as was testified to by AT&T’s tariff

59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 988-989.
62. Id. at 988.
63. Central Office Telephone, Inc. v. American Telephone and Telegraph Company, 108
F.3d 981, 994 (1997).
64. Id. at 990. The court found that the filed-rate doctrine could not apply to any of COT’s
claims with regard to billing, even if it could apply to other aspects of the SDN service.
65. Id. at 989.
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expert at trial.66 The court found that the filed-rate doctrine could therefore not
apply to any of COT’s claims regarding that billing.67
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether COT’s state
law claims were preempted by the federal filed-rate requirements of the
Communications Act.68 The Court reversed the decision of the Ninth Circuit,
finding that COT’s state law claims were preempted by the Communications
Act.69
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

Court Opinion

Justice Scalia delivered the majority opinion. First the majority considered
the intent of the Communications Act, and examined the nature of special rates
and privileges covered by the Communications Act.70 They next analyzed
COT’s claims and determined their origin.71 They concluded that COT’s state
law claims were derived from their contractual relationship with AT&T, and
that COT’s claims were therefore preempted by §203 of the Communications
Act.72
1. The History and Intent of the Communications Act
The majority first looked to the history and development of the
Communications Act.73 The Communications Act required every common
carrier to file tariffs of charges with the FCC, describing all charges and
conditions affecting those charges.74 In addition, §203(c) of the Act made it
illegal to allow any special privileges or charges, unless specified in the
published tariff.75 The Communications Act modeled its provisions on the
earlier Interstate Commerce Act, which regulated transportation carriers.76 The
66. Id. at 990. AT&T’s expert testified that the provisions of the tariffs do not apply
between AT&T and the reseller (COT), but between AT&T and the end user.
67. Id.
68. 47 U.S.C. §203(a) is the “filed-rate” section of the Communications Act.
69. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1956,
1965 (1998).
70. Id. at 1962. Looking at 47 U.S.C. §§ 203(a) and 203(c), the Court traces the history of
the “filed-rate doctrine”, and its application in several cases involving rate disputes.
71. Id. at 1964 where the Court is determining whether the claims in question were “wholly
derivative” of the tariff agreement.
72. Id. at 1965.
73. Id. at 1962.
74. Id. at 1962; See also 47 U.S.C. § 203(a).
75. See 47 U.S.C. § 203(c) which addresses the similar problems seen in prior transportation
cases where special rates or privileges were given to one shipper but not to another.
76. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1956,
1962 (1998).
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goal of both of these Acts was to prevent unreasonable and discriminatory
charges.77
The majority then examined several prior cases where the filed-rate
doctrine had been held to be the only lawful charge,78 even if a common carrier
intentionally misstated its rate and a customer relied on that
misrepresentation.79 While recognizing the perceived harshness of this rule,80
the majority cited MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone &
Telegraph Co. where the Court explained that maintaining nondiscriminatory
rates is the goal of the Communications Act, and that the filed rate doctrine
was “the heart of the common-carrier section of the Communications Act.”81
The majority further explained that these discriminatory privileges can
come in many forms, and did not have to simply be discounted rates.82 Citing
Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, the majority concluded that any special
privileges not spelled out in the tariff can be a violation of the Communications
Act.83
2. The Communications Act Applied to COT’s Claim
The majority next examined the state law claims that COT levied against
AT&T and whether those claims were preempted by the Communications
Act.84 The majority concluded that the issues raised by COT – the
representations made by AT&T concerning fast hookup time for the SDN
service, the allocation of billing charges, and other matters – were precisely the
subjects specifically addressed by AT&T’s filed tariff.85 The majority found
that COT’s tort claim derived only from the contractual relationship with
AT&T.86
The majority further explained that guarantees of times for establishment
of service, and agreements to allocate charges in a particular way, are in “flat

77. Id.
78. Id., citing Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981) and United
States Nav. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474, 481 (1932).
79. Id. at 1962. See also Kansas City Southern R.R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U.S. 639, 653 (1913).
80. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1956,
1963 (1998).
81. Id., citing MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
512 U.S. 218, 229 (1994).
82. Id. at 1963.
83. Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155 (1912), where an agreement to use a
faster train for a particular shipment was held to be invalid because the shipper’s tariff did not
provide for the use of any particular train.
84. American Telephone & Telegraph Company v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct.
1956, 1963 (1998).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1964.
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contradiction” to the tariff. 87 Noting that COT’s claims are the very types of
claims that the Communications Act was meant to preempt, the majority cites
Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R.R. Co. where the Court stated that “[t]he
rights as defined by the tariff cannot be varied or enlarged by either contract or
tort of the carrier.”88
Finally, the majority dismisses COT’s argument that §414 of the
Communications Act dictates a different result, and that the relief awarded by
the jury below is consistent with the tariff.89 The majority cites long-held
cases holding that §414 of the Communications Act90 preserves only those
rights that are not inconsistent with the filed-tariff requirements.91
The majority reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit, and held that
COT’s state law claims were preempted by the filed rated doctrine of the
Communications Act.92
B.

Concurring Opinion

Chief Justice Rehnquist provided his perspective in the concurring opinion.
The concurrence expanded on the majority’s finding that the tortious
interference was “wholly derivative of the contract claim”, and was therefore
barred by the filed-rate doctrine.93
Chief Justice Rehnquist pointed out that this “wholly derivative” finding
was necessary to prevent COT’s tort claim from proceeding.94 The filed-rate
doctrine’s purpose is to ensure that the tariff sets the terms by which the
common carrier provides services to its customers.95 Chief Justice Rehnquist
also noted that it is crucial to recognize that this is the only relationship that the
tariff controls.96 Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that in order for
the filed-rate doctrine to work correctly, it only needs to preempt suits that
seek to alter the terms and conditions set forth in the tariff.97 Citing Chicago &
Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby and Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R.R. Co. as
cases where parties sought special treatment or special rates in violation of the
87. Id. at 1964.
88. Id. at 1965.
89. Id.
90. 47 U.S.C. § 414, the saving clause of the Communications Act duplicates the saving
clause of the ICA which preserves only those rights that are not inconsistent with the statutory
filed-tariff requirements.
91. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1956,
1965 (1998). See also Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 507 (1913).
92. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1956,
1965-1966 (1998).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
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tariff’s filed rates.98 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that this case was similar.
Here, as in the cited cases, COT attempted to enforce an agreement with terms
different than those set forth in the tariff.99 Therefore, as in the cited cases, the
filed-rate doctrine should bar such a claim.100
Chief Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that the filed-rate doctrine does not
control the entire relationship between the common carrier and its
customers.101 The doctrine exists only to ensure that the filed rates are the
exclusive source of the terms for providing services.102 It cannot act as a shield
against all state law claims, only against those claims that derive from the
tariff.103
C. Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, arguing that COT’s tort claim
stands separately from the contract claim, and was therefore not preempted by
the filed-rate doctrine.104 The dissent agreed with the majority that the tort
claim would be barred by the filed-rate doctrine if it were “wholly derivative of
the contract claim”.105 However, the dissent points out that the jury’s finding
on this tort claim was supported by evidence that went well beyond, and
differed in nature from, the contract claim.106
The dissent pointed out that while the majority was correct in stating that
the filed-rate doctrine would preempt some tort claims, the Court has never
before applied that doctrine to bar relief for conduct so far removed from the
relationship governed by that doctrine.107

98. See Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby, 225 U.S. 155 (1912), where a promise to
provide a particular fast train for shipment was found to be in contradiction of the filed tariff, and
therefore unenforceable. See also Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R.R. Co., 260 U.S. 156
(1922) where an antitrust complaint challenging the rate that was filed and the tariff was
disallowed.
99. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1956,
1966 (1998).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1956,
1967 (1998).
105. Id.
106. Id. The dissent argues that if AT&T had included a letter in each bill it sent that
characterized COT as unethical, then that tortious conduct would certainly not be defendable
under the filed-rate doctrine. Similarly, the dissent argues, the information that AT&T did send
out to COT’s customers showing COT’s markup on their bills should not be defendable under
that doctrine.
107. Id. at 1968.
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Furthermore, the dissent distinguished this case from the precedents relied
upon by the majority.108 COT’s tort claim never challenged the filed-rates as
in Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern R.R. Co., and it does not seek special
services as in Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Kirby and Davis v. Cornwell.109
The dissent sees this case as being analogous to Nader v. Allegheny Airlines,
Inc., where the court held that a common-law tort claim could coexist with the
Federal Aviation Act.110
Finally, the dissent was troubled that the majority’s holding essentially
closed the door to state law tort claims for tortious interference with business
relations merely because the relationship involved a common carrier.111 The
dissent pointed out that in this case, at least some of the interference occurred
independently of the customer-carrier relationship. Therefore, there would
have been a sustainable action even if the contract had never been entered
into.112
V. IMPLICATIONS
The implications of the Court’s decision in this case are subtle, yet
potentially far-reaching. On first examination, the Court seemed to simply
uphold the longstanding preemption authority of the filed-rate doctrine of the
Communications Act. However, on closer examination, the Court appears to
have broadened the scope of that doctrine.
The Court in AT&T found that the claim of tortious interference was
“wholly derivative” of the regulated contract claim,113 rather than an
independent claim, and was therefore preempted by the filed-rate doctrine. As
Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, the jury in the district court found
that AT&T had acted willfully and intentionally in interfering with COT’s
business relations.114 This, he maintained, established that the tortious conduct
of AT&T was not merely derivative of the contract violations, it was
independent conduct that should not be afforded protection by the
Communications Act provisions.115 The Court, however, held that the conduct
of AT&T was derivative of the regulated relationship, and that the claim was
superceded by the filed-rate doctrine.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290 (1976), where a state law tort claim
was not superceded by the Federal Aviation Act, it was found to be related to the authority of the
Act.
111. American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Central Office Telephone, Inc., 118 S.Ct. 1956,
1968 (1998).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1965.
114. Id. at 1968.
115. Id.
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With this holding, the Court provides an opening that future defendants
may take advantage of. Defendants in communications cases involving
common carriers will certainly attempt to use the holding in AT&T as a shield
from liability for their actions. While previous cases provided for rate and
provision agreements to be superceded by the filed-rate doctrine, this case
allows conduct that is beyond that relationship to also be preempted by the
doctrine. The holding in AT&T provides great incentive for establishing that
the defendant’s activities were merely somehow related to the regulated
contractual relationship. If defendants can establish this relationship, they can
use the preemptive authority of the Communications Act and the holding in
AT&T as a shield, and dismiss any state-law claims against them.
As the communications industry expands, with telephone, cellular, and
even Internet communication continuing to grow exponentially, many more
consumer and communications companies will enter into agreements for
services. While parties will likely adhere to the terms of these agreements,
there will certainly be cases where conflicts occur as to the terms of the
agreement, or the conduct of the parties to the agreement.
The
Communications Act and the filed-rate doctrine exist to regulate the properly
charged rates and the terms of communications agreements. Under the filedrate doctrine, any agreements contrary to the filed tariffs will be superceded,
and only the published, filed tariff rates will apply. However, under AT&T, the
conduct of the parties, however egregious, may also be regulated by the
Communications Act and the filed-rate doctrine. Even tortious conduct, if
somehow related to the contractual agreement, may be superceded by the
Communications Act.
Consumers are likely to be the losers, as
communications companies seek protection for any of their tortious conduct
behind the shield of the Communications Act.
VI. CONCLUSION
The decision in AT&T is not dramatic, yet it will likely be far reaching.
While the decision upholds the preemptive power of the filed-rate doctrine of
the Communications Act, it also arguably extends that power beyond its
previous reach. The Court in AT&T has extended the preemptive power of the
Communications Act beyond claims concerning only the actual regulated
contractual agreement to claims that are merely related to the agreement.
Communications companies currently regulated by the filed-rate doctrine of
the Communications Act, as well as those that enter the industry in the future,
may be tempted to test the waters at the edge of the decision, and rely on the
Communications Act to shield them from state law tort claims.
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